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The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition introduces fundamental
questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One
of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight
languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a
topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and
issues: what is phenomenology? phenomenology and the cognitive
sciences consciousness and self-consciousness time and
consciousness intentionality and perception the embodied mind
action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds
phenomenology and personal identity. This third edition has been
revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological
methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative
research, and there are new sections discussing important, recent
research on topics such as critical phenomenology, imagination,
social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality, and
selfhood. Also included are helpful features, such as chapter
summaries, guides to further reading, and boxed explanations of
specialized topics, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition
an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive
science, and philosophy of mind.
The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition introduces fundamental
questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One
of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight
languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a
topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and
issues: what is phenomenology? phenomenology and the cognitive
sciences consciousness and self-consciousness time and
consciousness intentionality and perception the embodied mind
action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds
phenomenology and personal identity. This third edition has been
revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological
methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative
research, and there are new sections discussing important, recent
research on topics such as critical phenomenology, imagination,
social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality, and
selfhood. Also included are helpful features, such as chapter
summaries, guides to further reading, and boxed explanations of
specialized topics, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition
an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive
science, and philosophy of mind.
Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to
one of the dominant philosophical movements of the 20th century.
This lively and lucid book provides an introduction to the
essential phenomenological concepts that are crucial for
understanding great thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi
examines and explains key questions such as: What is a
phenomenological analysis? What are the methodological foundations
of phenomenology? What does phenomenology have to say about
embodiment and intersubjectivity? How is phenomenology
distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? How
do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in
psychology and qualitative research? With a glossary of key terms
and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key
philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal
starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible
introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology.
It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known
as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger,
was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical
metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the
view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure
transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains
Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic.
The continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts has made it
necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both
Husserl's published works and posthumous material, "Husserl's
Phenomenology" incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl
research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the
chronological development of Husserl's thought, from his early
analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature
transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and
constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and
lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated
introduction to his thinking.
Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to
one of the dominant philosophical movements of the 20th century.
This lively and lucid book provides an introduction to the
essential phenomenological concepts that are crucial for
understanding great thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi
examines and explains key questions such as: What is a
phenomenological analysis? What are the methodological foundations
of phenomenology? What does phenomenology have to say about
embodiment and intersubjectivity? How is phenomenology
distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? How
do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in
psychology and qualitative research? With a glossary of key terms
and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key
philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal
starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible
introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology.
The essays in this book seek to address the following issue: to
what extent can the current discussion of consciousness in
mainstream cognitive science and analytical philosophy of mind
profit from insights drawn from the investigations of subjectivity
found in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition (Kant,
Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard), as well as in the phenomenological
and hermeneutical tradition. The contributions include some that
are philosophical, while others relate to issues in empirical
science, such as psychopathology, cognitive neuroscience, and
developmental psychology. Contributors include Andrew Brook, John
Drummond, Shaun Gallagher, Arne Groen, Josef Parnas, Peter
Poellner, Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Louis Sass, Dieter Teichert, and
the editor.
It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known
as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger,
was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical
metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the
view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure
transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains
Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic.
The continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts has made it
necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both
Husserl's published works and posthumous material, "Husserl's
Phenomenology" incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl
research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the
chronological development of Husserl's thought, from his early
analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature
transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and
constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and
lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated
introduction to his thinking.
Husserl's phenomenology has often been criticized for its
Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic and solipsistic nature.
Today, this widespread interpretation must be regarded as being
outdated, since it gives but a very partial and limited picture of
Husserl's thinking. The continuing publication of Husserl's
research manuscripts has disclosed analyses which have made it
necessary to revise and modify a number of standard readings. This
anthology documents the recent development in Husserl research. It
contains contributions from a number of young phenomenologists, who
have all defended their dissertation on Husserl in the nineties,
and it presents a new type of interpretation which emphasizes the
dimensions of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in
Husserl's thinking.
Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is
selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially
constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does
empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential
acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about
the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis
on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a
satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a
necessary requirement for the latter? Engaging with debates and
findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in
various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other
offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics
as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping,
mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied
simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment,
narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self
accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that
wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life
serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time,
however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has
to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various
complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice
to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental
level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not
constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that
there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that
are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this
claim through a close analysis of shame.
The nature and reality of self is a subject of increasing
prominence among Western philosophers of mind and cognitive
scientists. It has also been central to Indian and Tibetan
philosophical traditions for over two thousand years. It is time to
bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary
debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its
kind. Leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan
traditions join with leading Western philosophers of mind and
phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood
from these multiple perspectives. Self, No Self? is not a
collection of historical or comparative essays. It takes
problem-solving and conceptual and phenomenological analysis as
central to philosophy. The essays mobilize the argumentative
resources of diverse philosophical traditions to address issues
about the self in the context of contemporary philosophy and
cognitive science. Self, No Self? will be essential reading for
philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of
the self and consciousness, and will offer a valuable way into the
subject for students.
Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivitat analyses the
transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity, and argues that an
intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can
already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl
eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental
subjectivity was a conditio sine qua non for a phenomenological
philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts
the book examines his reasons for this conviction and delivers a
detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of
intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his reflections on
transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying his
phenomenological core-concepts, thus making possible a new
understanding of his philosophy. Against this background the book
then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological
approach to intersubjectivity can contribute to the current
discussions of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a
systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of
Apel and Habermas. Die Abhandlung untersucht die transzendentale
Relevanz der Intersubjektivitat und zeigt, dass eine
intersubjektive Transformation der Transzendentalphilosophie schon
innerhalb der Phanomenologie - besonders der Husserlschen - zu
finden ist. Husserl gelangte zu der Auffassung, dass eine Analyse
und Einbeziehung der transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat als
conditio sine qua non fur eine phanomenologische Philosophie zu
betrachten sei. Die Grunde, die Husserl zu dieser Uberzeugung
fuhrten, werden herausgearbeitet. Dabei weist die Analyse des
radikalen und komplexen Begriffs der Intersubjektivitat auf, dass
erst seine Uberlegungen zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat
viele phanomenologische Grundbegriffe ins rechte Licht stellen
konnen und daruber hinaus ein neues Grundverstandnis seiner
Phanomenologie ermoglichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Frage,
inwieweit die Phanomenologie zur gegenwartigen
Intersubjektivitatsdiskussion beitragen kann, durch eine
systematische Auseinandersetzung mit der sprachpragmatischen
Intersubjektivitatstheorie von Apel und Habermas beantwortet.
The nature and reality of self is a subject of increasing
prominence among Western philosophers of mind and cognitive
scientists. It has also been central to Indian and Tibetan
philosophical traditions for over two thousand years. It is time to
bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary
debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its
kind. Leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan
traditions join with leading Western philosophers of mind and
phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood
from these multiple perspectives. Self, No Self? is not a
collection of historical or comparative essays. It takes
problem-solving and conceptual and phenomenological analysis as
central to philosophy. The essays mobilize the argumentative
resources of diverse philosophical traditions to address issues
about the self in the context of contemporary philosophy and
cognitive science. Self, No Self? will be essential reading for
philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of
the self and consciousness, and will offer a valuable way into the
subject for students.
Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivitat analyses the
transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity, and argues that an
intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can
already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl
eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental
subjectivity was a conditio sine qua non for a phenomenological
philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts
the book examines his reasons for this conviction and delivers a
detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of
intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his reflections on
transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying his
phenomenological core-concepts, thus making possible a new
understanding of his philosophy. Against this background the book
then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological
approach to intersubjectivity can contribute to the current
discussions of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a
systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of
Apel and Habermas. Die Abhandlung untersucht die transzendentale
Relevanz der Intersubjektivitat und zeigt, dass eine
intersubjektive Transformation der Transzendentalphilosophie schon
innerhalb der Phanomenologie - besonders der Husserlschen - zu
finden ist. Husserl gelangte zu der Auffassung, dass eine Analyse
und Einbeziehung der transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat als
conditio sine qua non fur eine phanomenologische Philosophie zu
betrachten sei. Die Grunde, die Husserl zu dieser Uberzeugung
fuhrten, werden herausgearbeitet. Dabei weist die Analyse des
radikalen und komplexen Begriffs der Intersubjektivitat auf, dass
erst seine Uberlegungen zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat
viele phanomenologische Grundbegriffe ins rechte Licht stellen
konnen und daruber hinaus ein neues Grundverstandnis seiner
Phanomenologie ermoglichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Frage,
inwieweit die Phanomenologie zur gegenwartigen
Intersubjektivitatsdiskussion beitragen kann, durch eine
systematische Auseinandersetzung mit der sprachpragmatischen
Intersubjektivitatstheorie von Apel und Habermas beantwortet."
EugĂne Minkowskiâs Lived Time articulates a phenomenology of
time that is as inspired by the philosophical writings of Henri
Bergson and Edmund Husserl as it is by the psychiatric descriptions
of Eugen Bleuler. After providing a phenomenological description of
the experience of time in normal life, Minkowski considers a number
of mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, manic depression, and
dementia, and he attempts to show that these pathological cases can
be characterized in terms of a distortion of lived time and space.
First published in French in 1933 as Le temps vĂcu, this edition
of this classic work of phenomenological psychiatry and
psychopathology includes a new foreword by Dan Zahavi that presents
some of Minkowski's main ideas and discusses his contemporary
relevance.
Recent work on empathy theory, research, and applications, by
scholars from disciplines ranging from neuroscience to
psychoanalysis. There are many reasons for scholars to investigate
empathy. Empathy plays a crucial role in human social interaction
at all stages of life; it is thought to help motivate positive
social behavior, inhibit aggression, and provide the affective and
motivational bases for moral development; it is a necessary
component of psychotherapy and patient-physician interactions. This
volume covers a wide range of topics in empathy theory, research,
and applications, helping to integrate perspectives as varied as
anthropology and neuroscience. The contributors discuss the
evolution of empathy within the mammalian brain and the development
of empathy in infants and children; the relationships among
empathy, social behavior, compassion, and altruism; the neural
underpinnings of empathy; cognitive versus emotional empathy in
clinical practice; and the cost of empathy. Taken together, the
contributions significantly broaden the interdisciplinary scope of
empathy studies, reporting on current knowledge of the
evolutionary, social, developmental, cognitive, and neurobiological
aspects of empathy and linking this capacity to human
communication, including in clinical practice and medical
education.
What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social
construct--or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The
legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both
neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this,
in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of
self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He
investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness,
and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be
understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi
argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus
on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and
Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining
to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light
of contemporary discussions in consciousness research.Philosophical
phenomenology--as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, and others--not only addresses crucial issues often
absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a
conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills
the need--given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical
interest in subjectivity--for an account of the subjective or
phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to
researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is
to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central
importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental
psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other
philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology
can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.
In the rigorous and highly original "Self-Awareness and Alterity, "
Dan Zahavi provides a sustained argument that phenomenology,
especially in its Husserlian version, can contribute something
decisive to the analysis of self-awareness.
Taking on recent discussions within both analytical philosophy
(Shoemaker, Castaneda, Nagel) and contemporary German philosophy
(Henrich, Frank, Tugendhat), Zahavi argues that the
phenomenological tradition has much more to offer when it comes to
the problem of self-awareness than is normally assumed. As a
contribution to the current philosophical debate concerning
self-awareness, the book presents a comprehensive reconstruction of
Husserl's theory of pre-reflective self-awareness, thereby
criticizing a number of prevalent interpretations and a systematic
discussion of a number of phenomenological insights related to this
issue, including analyses of the temporal, intentional, reflexive,
bodily, and social nature of the self.
Les Lecons pour une phenomenologie de la conscience intime du
temps, professees par Husserl en 1905 a Gottingen, ont eu un
rayonnement considerable sur l'ensemble de la phenomenologie au XXe
siecle. La structure maitresse de l'analyse phenomenologique,
l'intentionalite, y est interrogee comme telle, et se voit revisee
de facon a ne plus necessairement etre indexee a la notion d'objet.
De nombreuses phenomenologies ulterieures, comme celles de
Heidegger, Levinas, Henry, y ont vu une promesse, ou la
delimitation meme de ce qui devait etre leur probleme. Le
commentaire ou la reecriture de ce texte, de Heidegger (son
editeur) a Derrida, a traverse toute la philosophie du XXe siecle.
Aujourd'hui que la reflexion sur le format linguistique de la
temporalisation ou sur la philosophie naturelle du temps
renouvellent l'interet philosophique pour cette question, les
lecons de 1905 se revelent aussi bien ouvertes a de nouvelles
lectures possibles, reveillant d'autres aspects de ce texte
exceptionnellement riche.
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